Japan faces a demographic time bomb unlike anything seen in modern history. The nation that once seemed poised to become an economic superpower is now rapidly shrinking, with projections showing it could lose almost two-thirds of its current population by the end of this century.
The ‘Mass Mortality’ Phenomenon
Japan’s birth rate has fallen to unprecedented lows, with just 720,988 babies born in 2024, marking the ninth consecutive year of decline and the lowest number since records began 125 years ago. This represents a 5% decrease from the previous year, despite government initiatives meant to encourage childbearing. Meanwhile, Japan recorded approximately 1.62 million deaths in the same period, meaning more than two people died for every new baby born.
While many developed countries face declining birth rates, Japan’s situation is particularly severe. Its fertility rate, the average number of children a woman is expected to have in her lifetime, stands at just 1.20, far below the 2.1 needed to maintain population stability according to Health Ministry data from 2023 Associated Press. In stark contrast to countries like the United States where births outside marriage are common, only a small percentage of Japanese babies are born to unmarried mothers, creating a strong correlation between marriage rates and birth rates.
While much attention focuses on Japan’s falling birth rate, the country is simultaneously experiencing what demographers call a “many death” phenomenon. The annual death toll has surged to around 1.6 million people, the highest in modern Japanese history outside wartime. Over the next 50 years, approximately 80 million Japanese will die — about two-thirds of the current population.
Impact on Tokyo and Other Major Cities
While rural Japan has felt the demographic crisis most acutely, major urban centers like Tokyo are not immune. Despite attracting internal migrants from other parts of Japan, Tokyo’s population is aging rapidly. By 2054, it’s estimated that more than 30% of Tokyo’s population will be over 65, transforming what has long been one of the world’s most vibrant cities.
The implications are visible throughout urban Japan: shuttered storefronts, underutilized infrastructure, and housing complexes increasingly dominated by elderly residents. Even Tokyo’s famous energy and crowded trains may gradually give way to a quieter, older city with different needs and rhythms.
The Rising National Burden Rate
One of the key factors driving Japan’s low birth rate is the increasing financial burden placed on working-age citizens. The national burden rate, the percentage of income going to taxes and social insurance premiums, has risen dramatically in recent decades, approaching 50% of income for many workers. This has been dubbed the “five-public, five-private” phenomenon, meaning half of earnings go to the government.
As working adults face higher premiums to support the growing elderly population, they have less disposable income for themselves and potential families. The irony is painful: policies designed to support “future generations” are making those future generations less likely to exist.
The Path Forward
Japan is not alone in facing demographic decline, though its case is among the most severe. Countries like South Korea, Italy, and parts of Eastern Europe face similar challenges. Those that have managed to partially reverse fertility declines, such as France and Sweden, have implemented comprehensive family support policies, including generous parental leave, accessible childcare, and housing assistance.
However, cultural differences make direct policy transfers difficult. What works in Nordic countries may not translate directly to Japan’s context. The most promising approach likely combines elements from multiple successful models, adapted to Japan’s specific circumstances.
Perhaps the most critical insight from Japan’s experience is that protecting future generations requires supporting those who would create those generations now. Policies that increase the immediate financial strain on working-age people in order to sustain benefits for the elderly have proven counterproductive for population stability.
Creating an environment where young adults can achieve financial security, afford housing, and balance work with family life is essential to any hope of demographic recovery. This means not just child allowances but fundamental reforms to Japan’s economic structure, labor markets, and social security systems.
As Kazuhisa Arakawa, a researcher and columnist specializing in celibacy in Japan noted, “The future is simply the continuation of the present.” If Japan cannot make its present livable for young adults, it cannot expect them to create its future.
